BELIEFS is the answer
What are the relations between emotions and related phenomena, on the one hand, and values, on the other hand? We investigate numerous versions of the claim that emotions have values as their formal objects and the relations between such claims and the thesis in psychology that emotions constitutively involve appraisals. The investigation proceeds in two directions. First, we consider the general theory of formal objects and its role in a theory of intentionality and knowledge and attempt to locate the place of values, emotions and preferences within such a theory. Secondly, we consider a series of more specific questions. In particular, what does it mean to say that we care about moral values and that we should care about them? What is the role of the distinction between appropriate and inappropriate emotions in the development of folk morality? How should we distinguish between inappropriate emotions, quasi-emotions and sham emotions?
1. Formal objects, intentionality and value
Philosophers and psychologists have often claimed that emotions involve appraisals or evaluations. One version of this claim has it that values are the “formal objects” (Kenny) or “correlates” (Husserl) of emotions. What do such claims mean? Are they true?